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Foreword 
 
In the early 1960s the United States Supreme Court struck down a 
Connecticut law that made it a crime to use “any drug, medicinal article or 
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception.” Estelle Griswold, the 
Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, was 
arrested when the New Haven Planned Parenthood clinic provided 
contraceptive counseling and prescriptions. She was convicted and 
appealed, culminating in the landmark 1965 Griswold v. Connecticut 
decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas concluded that a right to 
privacy, while not established by the text of the Bill of Rights, is found in 
the penumbra of other rights; concurring opinions relied also on the due 
process clause and the Ninth Amendment.  
  
The fifty years since Griswold v. Connecticut have seen no abatement 
in the debate over the margins and underpinnings of this decision. This 
anniversary of the decision is a proper moment to revisit the debate, and 
separating heat from light, allowing us to reflect and discover some of the 
themes running through it. This is especially fruitful given how much has 
changed since the Griswold decision.  New reproductive technologies have 
enabled us to create and define family in ways barely contemplated at that 
time. And new law in other areas of human rights and regulation of private 
sexuality has enriched the field in which Griswold sits.  
 
At the same time, we find that the most fundamental issues underlying 
Griswold  endure. As our panelists Cary Franklin and Kim Buchanan argued, 
high among those is the class-based nature of the debate. It was an open 
secret during the 1950s and 1960s in Connecticut as elsewhere that 
contraception was available to women who could afford a private doctor. It 
was only the actions of the Planned Parenthood clinic, making reproductive 
self-determination available to poor women, that prompted the criminal 
prosecution that was appealed to the Supreme Court. Then, as now, the 
debate over contraception, and more recently abortion, has as a practical 
matter centered over social control over the bodies of women of outclasses.  
 
As Priscilla Smith argues in Contraceptive Comstockery: Reasoning 
from Immorality to Illness in the Twenty-First Century, many of the 
justifications for limiting women’s access to contraception, when examined, 
reveal an underlying motive of seeking to relegate women to traditional roles 
as mothers, and not necessarily at the times of their choosing. Smith finds 
that arguments presented amid concerns for physical health, when examined 
critically, are founded on a more basic discomfort over women’s ability to 
choose and enjoy sex for its own sake.  
 
On a more general level, Griswold was one of a number of cases 
highlighting the persistent role of the state in regulating intimate conduct. 
As Melissa Murray points out in Griswold’s Criminal Law, the Griswold 
decision follows a long line of cases, statutes, and scholarly and public 
debates over the use of the criminal law to control private behavior. In 
particular, one can find in these cases a theme of laws “protecting” women 
from the consequences of exercising their own liberty.   
 
Apart from their examinations of the efforts to limit reproductive rights, 
our authors also provide a rigorous constitutional framework to support 
these elements of privacy in a sustainable fashion. Neil Siegel and Reva 
Siegel, in Compelling Interests and Contraception, analyze the state 
interests that could apply in cases like Hobby Lobby that present instances 
of social control over reproductive rights. As they point out, the caselaw on 
the compelling state interests that should protect these rights is inadequately 
developed, and as a result often inadequately weighed. They set out a theory 
of both community and personal interests that collectively justify the 
compelling state interest to be protected. There are community interests in 
equality, economic growth, and public health that call for protection of 
women’s right to control their own bodies. At the same time there are 
personal interests in dignity, self determination, and autonomy that are 
worthy of constitutional consideration. In combination these community and 
personal interests should be considered in assessing the importance of 
constitutional protection from state regulation of private conduct.  
 
Together with our other speakers, Douglas NeJaime, Susan Schmeiser, 
Kim Buchanan, and Cary Franklin, these authors provide a powerful new 
perspective on the debate following Griswold. It is the duty of legal scholars 
to test and uncover the fundamental truths beneath our public debates and 
search for principles. There are few areas warranting such vigorous 
exploration as state control of personal conduct regarding sexuality. We 
thank these scholars for sharing their explorations with us at the University 
of Connecticut School of Law.   
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